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I. INTRODUCTION
Most lawyers and some clients believe that information about the client is
confidential. While they are correct, and confidentiality is an integral part of the
relationship between attorneys and clients, three bodies of law give confidentiality
its effect. First, attorneys owe each client a broad ethical duty of confidentiality.1
Second, the attorney-client privilege protects certain communications between
attorneys and clients, preventing later disclosure in adversarial proceedings.2 Third,
the work product doctrine protects some information prepared in anticipation of
litigation.3 The differences between the three is best understood by knowing which
of the concepts can be used to prevent admission of the material in court. As this
article indicates, the fact that something is ethically confidential does not mean it
is inadmissible in court. Rather, information must be either work-product or fall
under the attorney-client privilege to prevent its admissibility. While this article
focuses on the second body of law, the attorney-client privilege, it is important
to understand all three confidentiality concepts. Otherwise, lawyers will face
confusion regarding which confidentiality concept should apply at which time.
First, this article outlines the three confidentiality concepts.4 Then, it
highlights problems with Wyoming’s current attorney-client privilege statute and
1

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2014).

2

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (2017).

3

See WYO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).

4

See infra notes 7–75 and accompanying text.
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suggests ways to improve it.5 Finally, the article proposes a new attorney-client
privilege statute for Wyoming.6

II. THE CONFIDENTIALITY CONCEPTS
As noted above, three distinct bodies of law govern the treatment of
confidential information arising from the attorney-client relationship.7 This part
explains these bodies of law, referring to each as a confidentiality concept.

A. The First Confidentiality Concept: The Ethical Duty of Confidentiality
1. The General Duty of Confidentiality
Rule 1.6 of Wyoming’s Rules of Professional Conduct contains the general
ethical duty of confidentiality. It states, “[a] lawyer shall not reveal confidential
information relating to the representation of clients unless the client gives informed
consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out representation
or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”8 Rule 1.6(b) permits or requires
disclosure in certain contexts, discussed below.9

2. The Duty’s Broad Scope
As the language quoted above indicates, the ethical duty of confidentiality
applies to all confidential information the attorney learns about the representation.10
How or when the attorney learns the information is immaterial; the obligation
still exists.11 An important limitation regarding the scope of this duty, however, is
Wyoming’s use of the word confidential before information.12
The Rules define confidential information as “information provided by the
client or relating to the client which is not otherwise available to the public.”13
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and most states relying on their own
versions of these rules, do not use the word confidential. Rather, the duty of
confidentiality often applies to all information regarding the representation.14
5

See infra notes 76 –194 and accompanying text.

6

See Part IV [hereinafter Proposed Statute].

7

See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.

8

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (2014).

9

See infra notes 22– 44 and accompanying text.

10

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.

12

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

13

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(b).

E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client . . . .”).
14
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As a practical matter, Wyoming’s use of confidential means that an attorney
who has entered an appearance for a client may disclose that.15 The reason is that
most court files are public.16

3. When the Duty Arises
Most of the duties flowing from the attorney-client relationship attach only
after the client has requested the attorney to render legal services and the attorney
has agreed to do so.17 But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality
under Rule 1.6, that attach when the attorney agrees to consider whether an
attorney-client relationship shall be established.18
Even when no attorney-client relationship ensues, an attorney who has had
discussions with prospective clients must not use or reveal information learned in
the consultation, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of
a former client.19

4. The Duty Never Ends
A lawyer is never free of the ethical duty of confidentiality.20 Even after the
attorney-client relationship has ended, attorneys must maintain confidentiality.21

5. Exceptions to the Duty of Confidentiality
Rule 1.6(a) permits disclosure of confidential client information if one of
three conditions is met.22 First, if the client gives informed consent. Second, if the
disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. And third, if
paragraph (b) of Rule 1.6 authorizes disclosure. Each are discussed below.23
If a client gives an attorney their informed consent, the attorney may reveal
client information.24 Informed consent is defined as “the agreement by a person
15

See infra note 16 and accompanying text.

16

Some court files, such as juvenile court files, are private.

17

See infra notes 18, 92–96 and accompanying text.

While the ethical duty arises when a lawyer decides whether to form a lawyer-client
relationship, it is not clear whether the other two confidentiality concepts arise then. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 (2017). One reason for the proposed
statute is to clarify that the privilege will arise at the time a lawyer contemplates representation.
18

19

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.18(b) (2014).

20

Id. r. 1.9(c), 1.6 cmt. 20.

21

Id.

22

Id. r. 1.6(a).

23

See infra notes 24 – 44 and accompanying text.

24

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a).
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to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate
information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available
alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.”25
The second exception, disclosure impliedly authorized to carry out
representation,26 raises an interesting question: When is something impliedly
authorized? Unfortunately, the term impliedly is not defined. It should, therefore,
be given its normal meaning.27 Impliedly is defined as something “tacitly
understood.”28 An attorney should not generally do something based on a tacit
understanding. Rather, they should obtain a written approval from the client
before disclosing information.
The third exception applies only if paragraph (b) of Rule 1.6 allows for it.
This rule prescribes circumstances in which disclosure is either permitted or
required.29 Since each client needs to be fully informed, the client needs to be
advised of those situations. These are considered below.30

a. Required Disclosures
An attorney must disclose information when required to do so by law.31
In Wyoming, clients need to know of two situations in which attorneys must
reveal information. First, all persons in Wyoming, including attorneys, who know
or have reason to believe a child is being abused or neglected must notify the
appropriate authorities.32 Similarly, any person, including an attorney, who knows

25

Id. r. 1.0(f ).

26

Id. r. 1.6(a).

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-103(a)(i) (2017) (“Words and phrases shall be taken in their
ordinary and usual sense, but technical words and phrases having a peculiar and appropriate
meaning in law should be understood according to their technical import.”); see also Dorr v. Wyo.
Bd. of Cert. Pub. Accountants, 21 P.3d 735, 743 (Wyo. 2001) (“When a term is not defined within
a statutory scheme, we look to the ordinary and usual meaning accorded to the word.”).
27

Impliedly, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/impliedly?s=t (last visited
Mar. 12, 2018).
28

29

Id.

30

See infra notes 31– 44 and accompanying text.

31

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6).

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205(a) (2017) (“Any person who knows or has reasonable cause
to believe or suspect that a child has been abused or neglected or who observes any child being
subjected to conditions or circumstances that would reasonably result in abuse or neglect, shall
immediately report it to the child protective agency or local law enforcement agency or cause a
report to be made.”).
32
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or has reason to believe that an adult is abused, neglected, or exploited must
similarly notify the appropriate authorities.33
There is one circumstance in which an attorney may have to disclose
otherwise confidential information. Because an attorney has an ethical duty
of candor to every tribunal before which that attorney appears, the attorney
may have to correct any false information that the client or one of the client’s
witnesses provides to the court.34 While the rule only requires an attorney to take
“reasonable remedial actions,”35 such action may include disclosing confidential
information.36 Importantly, compliance is an exception to the general ethical duty
of confidentiality.37

b. Permitted Disclosures
An attorney may reveal confidential client information under Rule 1.6(b)
to prevent the client from committing a crime, or to the extent the attorney
reasonably believes necessary to prevent, mitigate, or rectify a client’s crime or
fraud.38 To prevent, mitigate, or rectify a client’s fraud, the client must have used
the attorney’s services in its furtherance.39 Moreover, the fraud must result in
substantial injury to the financial or property interests of another.40
Rule 1.6 provides four other exceptions to the ethical duty of confidentiality,
each of which allows an attorney to disclose confidential client information.
First, an attorney may reveal information to seek legal advice about whether
their conduct is ethical.41 Since such a revelation would be made to another
attorney, who would have an independent obligation of confidentiality, the
information would not otherwise become known. Second, an attorney may

Id. § 35-20-103(a) (“Any person or agency who knows or has reasonable cause to believe
that a vulnerable adult is being or has been abused, neglected, exploited, intimidated or abandoned
or is committing self neglect shall report the information immediately to a law enforcement agency
or the department.”).
33

34

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a).

35

Id. r. 3.3(a)(3).

36
Id. r. 3.3 cmt. 10 (“[T]he advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably
necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that
otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6.”).
37
Since lawyers must usually retain client information in confidence, this requirement
to disclose information to a tribunal operates as an important exception to the general duty
of confidentiality.
38

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1)–(3).

39

Id. r. 1.6(b)(2)–(3).

40

Id.

41

Id. r. 1.6(b)(4).
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disclose information if the attorney and the now former client become
adversaries.42 Third, an attorney may reveal information to determine whether
conflicts of interest exist because the attorney changes firms.43 Fourth, if a court
appoints the attorney as a guardian ad litem, the attorney may disclose information to protect the best interests of the individual.44

B. The Second Confidentiality Concept: The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege protects certain communications between
attorneys and clients from later disclosure in adversarial proceedings.45 Its
scope is, therefore, much narrower than the ethical duty of confidentiality.
The Wyoming Rules of Evidence are the source of Wyoming’s attorney-client
privilege.46 The Rules state, “[e]xcept as otherwise required by . . . statute . . .
the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principles of the common
law . . .”47
In Wyoming, a statute codifies the attorney-client privilege.48 It provides,
[a]n attorney [shall not testify] . . . concerning a communication
made to him by his client . . . in that relation, or his advice to his
client . . . . The attorney . . . may testify by express consent of the
client . . . , and if the client . . . voluntarily testifies the attorney
. . . may be compelled to testify on the same subject.49
In short, the privilege protects communications between an attorney and
client, in that relation.50
As discussed below, the Wyoming statute leaves many questions unanswered.51
These include, for example, who is a client and who is an attorney for the purpose
of the privilege, and what communications does the privilege protect? It would
therefore be good for both clients and attorneys for the statute to be amended.52

42

Id. r. 1.6(b)(5).

43

Id. r. 1.6(b)(7).

44

Id. r. 1.6(b)(8).

45

See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 (2017).

46

WYO. R. EVID. 501.

47

Id. (emphasis added).

48

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i).

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

See infra notes 82– 86 and accompanying text.

52

See infra notes 81–119 and accompanying text.
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C. The Third Confidentiality Concept: The Work Product Doctrine
A problem arose when Congress liberalized the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in the 1930’s. While the attorney-client privilege protected
communications between attorneys and clients, the privilege did not protect
attorney’s trial preparation materials.53 In Hickman v. Taylor, the U.S. Supreme
Court addressed the question as to whether some other privilege protected these
materials.54 In the opinion, the Court agreed that “the memoranda, statements
and mental impressions in issue . . . fall outside the scope of the attorney-client
privilege and hence are not protected from discovery on that basis.”55 Concerned
that a party was attempting to secure production of an opposing attorney’s trial
preparation materials without a showing of necessity or undue prejudice, the
Court denied discovery.56 It reasoned that “it is essential that a lawyer work with
a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties
and their counsel.”57 Allowing discovery of such materials “contravenes the public
policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims.”58
In essence, the Court invented a zone of privacy, known as the work product
doctrine, which protects an attorney’s materials prepared in anticipation of litigation
from discovery. This doctrine still exists but is no longer simply a product of the
Court’s imagination. Rather, it is now contained in both Wyoming’s rules of civil
and criminal procedure.59 The doctrine’s contours depend both on the type of
information sought and on the identity of the party who prepared it. The answers
to these questions largely dictate whether the information is discoverable.60

1. Civil Cases
a. The Type of Information Protected
In a civil case, the threshold question for asserting the work product doctrine
is whether the material was “prepared in anticipation of litigation.”61 If so, the
material falls under the protective umbrella of the doctrine. If not, the information
is discoverable unless otherwise privileged, so long as it is relevant to a party’s
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.62
53

See infra note 54 and accompanying text.

54

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

55

Id. at 508.

56

Id. at 509 –10.

57

Id. at 510.

58

Id.

59

WYO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); WYO. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2), (b)(2).

60

See infra notes 61–75 and accompanying text.

61

Thomas v. Harrison, 634 P.2d 328, 331, 339 (Wyo. 1981).

62

WYO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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If a party prepared information in anticipation of litigation, it is discoverable
only if the seeking party makes a requisite showing of substantial need, and
that equivalent materials cannot be obtained absent undue hardship.63 Upon a
requisite showing, the court may order discovery of the requested materials, but
must protect against disclosure of “the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of a party’s attorney . . . .”64

b. Attorney vs. Expert Trial Preparation Materials
As discussed above, attorneys enjoy absolute protection against discovery
of their mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories prepared
in anticipation of litigation.65 Often, attorneys employ the aid of experts in
preparation for trial. Whether an opposing party can discover an expert’s trial
preparation materials depends on whether the expert is expected to testify
at trial.66
If a party expects its expert to testify at trial, the opposing party can gain
information regarding that testimony through two avenues. First, the party
retaining the expert must disclose the expert’s identity, along with a written report
containing “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and
the basis and reasons for them,”67 “the facts or data considered by the witness in
forming them,”68 and “any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support
them.”69 If the party further desires information, the seeking party “may depose
any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented
at trial.”70
The rules are different if a retained expert is not expected to testify at trial.71
The opposing party may obtain discovery only as provided in Rule 35(b) reports
of a court-appointed examiner or “on showing exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on the same
subject by other means.”72

63

Id. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii).

64

Id. 26(b)(3)(B).

65

See supra notes 54– 60 and accompanying text.

66

WYO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).

67

Id. 26(a)(2)(B)(i).

68

Id. 26(a)(2)(B)(ii).

69

Id. 26(a)(2)(B)(iii).

70

Id. 26(b)(4)(A).

71

Id. 26(b)(4)(D).

72

Id.
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2. Criminal Cases
The doctrine’s application is similar in the criminal context.73 The Wyoming
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not permit “the discovery or inspection of
reports, memoranda, or other internal state documents made by the attorney
for the state . . . in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the
case . . . .”74 A reciprocal provision governs the defense’s materials.75

III. IMPROVING WYOMING’S ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The Wyoming Rules of Evidence permit all relevant evidence to be admitted,
unless law provides otherwise.76 This rule supports a fundamental purpose of
Wyoming’s evidentiary rules: ascertaining the truth in adversarial proceedings.77
The attorney-client privilege is an exception to this rule. The privilege
prevents admitting what might otherwise be highly probative relevant evidence,
the private communications between a client and their attorney.78 As Learned
Hand once conceded, “the privilege is to suppress the truth.”79 The purpose of
this privilege, though, is thought to outweigh the costs.80 Its purpose, the Supreme
Court declared, is “to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance
of law and administration of justice.”81
As mentioned above, Wyoming’s attorney-client privilege statute leaves many
questions unanswered.82 Furthermore, the Wyoming Supreme Court has offered
little guidance on how it should be read. As a result, practitioners face many
On the applicability of the work product doctrine to criminal cases in Wyoming, see
Alexander v. State, 823 P.2d 1198, 1201– 02 (Wyo. 1992) (holding that the trial court did not err
in denying defendant access to the work product behind the presentence investigative report). The
court stated that “it would be a dangerous precedent to open up the work product that goes behind
that report.” Id.
73

74

WYO. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).

Id. 16(b)(2) (“[T]his subdivision does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports,
memoranda, or other internal defense documents made by the defendant, or the defendant’s
attorneys . . . in connection with the investigation or defense of the case . . . .”).
75

76
WYO. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
statute, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.”).

Id. 102 (“[The Wyoming Rules of Evidence] shall be construed . . . to the end that the truth
may be ascertained . . . .”).
77

A client, for example, may tell his or her lawyer that the client committed a crime. Such
evidence would be extremely probative, but very prejudicial to the client.
78

79

United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1942).

80

See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).

81

Id. at 389.

82

See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol18/iss2/1

10

Burman and Pestinger: Improving Wyoming’s Attorney-Client Privilege

2018

IMPROVING WYOMING’S ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

267

uncertainties. These include the following types of inquiries. Who is a client and
who is an attorney for purposes of the privilege?83 What communications does
the privilege protect and which does it not?84 Does the rule prevent a client from
being compelled to disclose communications arising from the attorney-client
relationship, or just the attorney?85 Last, who may claim the privilege?86
This part addresses these questions, noting how other jurisdictions have resolved
them, and describes how the proposed statute incorporates these improvements
into Wyoming’s attorney-client privilege. The proposed statute follows.87

A. Attorney and Client
Wyoming’s attorney-client privilege statute applies to communications
between a client and an attorney.88 The application of these terms is clear when the
client is an individual directly communicating with an attorney. But the statute’s
applicability presents problems in the context of both prospective clients seeking
legal services and an attorney’s former clients who are now deceased.89 Moreover,
if the privilege extends to organizational entities, which communications with
which employees does the privilege protect?90 Finally, does the privilege apply
when a client corresponds indirectly with an attorney through the attorney’s
support staff ? 91 The following sections address these problems.

1. Prospective Clients
While it is clear that Wyoming’s statute covers communications arising
from an established attorney-client relationship, it is silent on whether the
privilege applies to prospective clients seeking legal services.92 Generally, courts
extend the privilege to include communications during an initial consultation
between a prospective client and attorney whether or not the attorney-client

83

See infra notes 88 –119 and accompanying text.

84

See infra notes 120 –86 and accompanying text.

85

See infra notes 187–89 and accompanying text.

86

See infra notes 190 –94 and accompanying text.

87

Proposed Statute.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (2017) (“An attorney . . . [shall not testify] concerning
a communication made to him by his client . . . or his advice to a client . . . .”).
88

89

See infra notes 92 –103 and accompanying text.

90

See infra notes 104 –14 and accompanying text.

91

See infra notes 115 –19 and accompanying text.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (“An attorney . . . [shall not testify] concerning a
communication made to him by his client . . . in that relation . . . .”) (emphasis added).
92
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relationship results thereafter.93 This broad application of the privilege affords
clients the freedom to choose legal representation.94 Fear of subsequent disclosure
might encourage a prospective client to selectively communicate only favorable
information to the attorney. Any advice based on this information, the California
Supreme Court noted, would be “useless, if not misleading . . . .”95 Poor advice
clearly frustrates a prospective client’s ability to make an informed decision
regarding legal representation. The proposed statute includes within the definition
of client a person or entity who “consults an attorney for the purpose of retaining
legal services.”96

2. Deceased Former Clients
The current statute does not address whether an attorney’s deceased
former client is a client for purposes of the privilege. Some commentators suggest
that the privilege should not survive a client’s death, a position grounded in a
policy of fairness to litigants, particularly when a communication between a
client and attorney bears on an issue of pivotal significance.97 No jurisdiction
has, however, adopted this view in either its legislation or case law.98 Moreover,
when the U. S. Supreme Court addressed the issue in relation to the federal
attorney-client privilege, it found “weighty reasons that counsel in favor of
posthumous application.”99 One reason the Court articulated in support of its
position was knowing that a communication will remain confidential following
death encourages full and frank correspondence with counsel.100 The Court
also reasoned that “clients may be concerned about reputation, civil liability, or
possible harm to family and friends.”101 Posthumous disclosure, the Court urged,
“may be as feared as disclosure during the client’s lifetime.”102 By allowing a

93
E.g., People v. Canfield, 527 P.2d 633, 636 –37 (Cal. 1974) (“The lawyer-client privilege is,
indeed, so extensive that where a person seeks the assistance of an attorney with a view to employing
him professionally, any information acquired by the attorney is privileged whether or not actual
employment results.”).
94

See JOHN M. BURMAN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN WYOMING 283 (2008).

95

City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 231 P.2d 26, 30 (Cal. 1951).

96

Proposed Statute (a)(ii).

See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 233 –35 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (considering exception
to the privilege in criminal cases when the statements bore on a significant aspect of the crimes at
issue and scarcity of other reliable evidence), overruled by Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524
U.S. 399 (1998).
97

Id. at 239 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
LAWYERS § 77 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2000)).
98

99

LAW GOVERNING

Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 407.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

OF THE

Id.
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former deceased client’s representative or attorney to assert the privilege on the
client’s behalf, the proposed statute adopts the universal view that the privilege
survives a client’s death.103

3. Organizational Entities
Organizational entities present two problems for Wyoming’s privilege statute.
First, are entities clients for purposes of the privilege?104 Second, if so, which
employee’s communications with an attorney are privileged?105
Wyoming’s statute does not explicitly recognize organizational entities
as clients. Though extending the privilege to include entities was formerly
a troublesome matter,106 it is no longer questioned,107 and the majority of
jurisdictions either assert or assume the privilege’s applicability to entities.108 The
rationale given for this broad application is that extending the privilege to entities
encourages them to have their agents confide in attorneys in order to realize the
entities’ rights and comply with the law.109 The proposed statute, then, includes
entities within the definition of client.110
Extending the privilege to entities presents a second problem: whose
communications from the entity to the attorney are protected? Courts have
developed two competing approaches to this problem. The first limits the
privilege to communications with persons in the entity authorized to seek and
act upon the attorney’s advice, such as corporate directors.111 The second applies
the “subject matter” test, protecting communications with any of the entity’s
employees or agents, so long as the communication relates to the subject matter

103

See Proposed Statute (a)(vi)(C).

104

See infra notes 106 –10 and accompanying text.

105

See infra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.

106

CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:21 (4th ed. 2013).

107

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000).

See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 –90 (1981) (“Admittedly
complications in the application of the privilege arise when the client is a corporation, which in
theory is an artificial creature of the law, and not an individual; but this Court has assumed that the
privilege applies when the client is a corporation.”).
108

109

See id.

110

Proposed Statute (a)(ii).

E.g., City of Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962)
(finding that privilege is limited to those who can “control or even . . . take a substantial part in a
decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney.”).
111
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of the entity’s representation.112 The rationale behind the latter approach is that
lower-level employees often know the facts relevant to litigation.113 This makes
sense because excluding communications between attorneys and those from an
entity with relevant knowledge frustrates the attorney’s ability to render adequate
advice. In turn, such exclusion would inhibit the entity from realizing their rights
and complying with the law. The proposed statute codifies the “subject matter”
test, protecting communications between an attorney and “an employee or agent
of an entity if the communications pertain to the subject matter of the attorney’s
representation of the entity . . . .”114

4. Non-attorney Support Staff
Communication between clients and attorneys often occurs indirectly,
through the attorney’s non-attorney support staff. These persons may include
firm insiders, such as secretaries, paralegals, or clerks, or outsiders to the firm,
like language interpreters, investigators, doctors, or accountants. Wyoming’s
current statute refers only to a client’s communications with an attorney, casting
uncertainty on the privilege’s applicability to communications between a client
and an attorney’s non-attorney support staff.115
Most courts agree that the privilege protects these communications.116 The
Third Restatement of The Law Governing Lawyers, for example, applies the
privilege to communications between “privileged persons,” including agents who
facilitate communication between the client and attorney.117 Privileged persons

112
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. d. In a leading United
States Supreme Court decision, Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Court held that the federal
attorney-client privilege protects information unavailable to corporate superiors, but available to
and communicated by lower level employees to corporate counsel that was needed to supply a basis
for legal advice concerning compliance with law. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391. The Court of Appeals
held that the communications fell outside the scope of the privilege because corporate superiors did
not communicate the information to corporate counsel. See id. In reversing, the Court criticized
the Court of Appeals’ approach, stating that its narrow scope interferes with corporate counsel’s
ability to formulate sound advice and threatens corporate counsel’s efforts “to ensure their client’s
compliance with the law.” Id.
113
Id. (finding that middle and lower level employees can “embroil the corporation in serious
legal difficulties,” and these employees often have relevant information that corporate counsel
needs); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5:21 (“[T]he control group test fails to
protect communications of important information to the attorney and thus impedes her ability to
help the corporation comply with the law.”).
114

Proposed Statute (a)(vii)(D).

115

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (2017).

See, e.g., Lluberes v. Uncommon Prods., LLC, 663 F.3d 6, 24 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that
privilege protects client confidences in pursuit of legal services “regardless of whether it came from
the client, his attorney, or an agent of either one.”).
116

117

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70.
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include those whose “participation is reasonably necessary to facilitate the client’s
communication with a lawyer . . . .”118 This approach best reflects the principle of
encouraging communication between attorneys and those needing legal services.
The proposed statute adopts this position.119

B. Communications
The attorney-client privilege applies to communications between attorneys
and clients.120 It follows that the privilege generally excludes other information
relating to legal representation, including the client’s identity, information about
fees, the general subject matter of consultation, and the fact of consultation itself.121
Wyoming’s statute does not, however, describe the kinds of communications the
privilege protects. This section outlines the consensus concerning the types of
communications the privilege protects and those it does not.122

1. Protected Communications
a. Communications Made in Confidence
The attorney-client privilege protects only those communications made in
confidence.123 This idea is merely implicit in Wyoming’s current privilege law,
despite explicit reference to this concept within the statute’s plain language.
There would be, after all, no reason for an evidentiary privilege protecting
communications made without an expectation of privacy.124
Yet jurisdictions have disagreed about whether the privilege covers those
communications intended to be confidential or those in which confidentiality is
reasonably implied from the circumstances.125 The Second Circuit, for instance,
118

Id. § 70 cmt. f.

119

Proposed Statute (a)(vii).

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (“The following persons shall not testify in certain
respects: [a]n attorney . . . concerning a communication made to him by his client . . . or his advice
to his client . . . .”) (emphasis added).
120

If, however, disclosing a client’s identity provides essential evidence to support convicting
the client of a crime, or if disclosing other facts of consultation directly or by reasonable inference
reveals the content of a confidential communication, courts agree that the privilege protects this
information. See Proposed Statute (c)(ii).
121

122

See infra notes 123– 86 and accompanying text.

E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(“[T]he attorney-client privilege may be invoked . . . with respect to: a communication made . . . in
confidence . . . .”).
123

124

See BURMAN, supra note 94, at 275–76.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71 cmt. b. The reason for
the disagreement may be that jurisdictions vary widely in regulating lawyers. They also vary in
determining the admissibility of evidence. Since the attorney-client privilege is part of the law of
evidence, wide variation is natural.
125
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has limited the privilege to “those communications which are intended to be
confidential.”126 Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit has been unwilling to protect a
communication if “no reasonable person could have expected it would later be
deemed protected.”127
While this variation exists, courts almost invariably apply the latter
approach, inquiring into whether a reasonable person would have expected the
communications to only reach other privileged persons.128 The proposed statute
reflects this approach, only protecting communications “made with the reasonable
belief that only privileged persons will learn of its contents . . . .”129

b. Oral or Written Words and Nonverbal Communicative Acts
Communications undoubtedly refer to oral and written statements.130
But less clear is whether the privilege protects nonverbal communicative acts.
The problem is, of course, that any client act in the presence of an attorney is
conceivably a communication.131
Courts agree the privilege applies to nonverbal acts, so long as the act is
intended as a communication.132 The Third Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers provides two helpful scenarios that illustrate this concept’s application. In
the first, a client charged with a crime retains defense counsel who obtains a police
report stating that the crime’s perpetrator had a tattooed right arm.133 In response

126

United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 447 (2nd Cir. 1954).

127

Esposito v. United States, 436 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1970).

See United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 722–23 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding no privilege for
statements defendant made to attorney on the phone because defendant knew he was “surrounded
by officers searching his residence”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71
cmt. b; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5:18 (“[F]actors that count are the nature of the
communications and any precautions designed to ensure confidentiality, where a reasonable person
would think such precautions suffice to keep what is said from becoming known by outsiders.”).
128

129

Proposed Statute (a)(iii).

E.g., Soter v. Cowles Publ’g. Co., 174 P.3d 60, 76 (Wash. 2007) (holding that privilege
extends to documents containing privileged communications); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. b (“A communication can be in any form. Most confidential
client communications to a lawyer are written or spoken words . . . .”).
130

131
See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 231 P.2d 26, 30 (Cal. 1951) (“[Almost]
any act, done by the client in the sight of the attorney and during the consultation, may conceivably
be done by the client as the subject of a communication . . . .” (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE,
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2306, at 590 (3d ed. 1940))).

E.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 503.14[3][a] (2d ed. 1997) (“Nonverbal conduct constitutes a communication within the privilege
if the client intended the act to make a confidential statement to the attorney in connection with
receiving legal services.”).
132

133

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. e, illus. 3.
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to the attorney’s question of whether the client’s right arm is tattooed, the client
rolls up their right sleeve revealing their forearm.134 Because the client intended
the act as a communication, the privilege attaches to the nonverbal act.135 But in
the second illustration, the client appears at the attorney’s office wearing a shortsleeved shirt, revealing a tattoo.136 This observation is not privileged because the
act had no communicative intent.137
The Fourth Circuit captured this view aptly when it wrote, “[T]he
privilege protects only the client’s confidences, not things which, at the time, are
not intended to be held in the breast of the lawyer, even though the attorneyclient relation provided the occasion for the lawyer’s observation of them.”138
Accordingly, the proposed statute protects “any expression . . . intended to
convey information . . . , including oral or written words, or acts intended to
communicate an idea . . . .”139

c. Communications Related to Receiving or Retaining
Legal Services
Wyoming’s current privilege statute applies to communications between an
attorney and client in that relation.140 Many communications between clients and
attorneys are not related to receiving or retaining legal services. Communications
may, for instance, relate to business matters, particularly when an attorney
represents an organizational client. Communications may also concern personal
matters, for example, when the attorney and client are friends. Courts agree
that these types of communications are not in that relation for purposes of the
attorney-client privilege, even if the communication is to or from a person
who is a client for other purposes.141 The test is whether the communication’s
purpose is for receiving or retaining legal services.142 The privilege does not

134

Id.

135

See id.

136

Id. § 69 cmt. e, illus. 4.

137

See id.

138

United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 1964).

139

Proposed Statute (a)(iii).

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (2017) (“An attorney [shall not testify] concerning a
communication made to him by his client . . . in that relation . . . .”).
140

141
E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 cmt. c (“[A] communication with a friend is not protected simply because the friend is a lawyer. Also not privileged
are communications with a person who is a lawyer but who performs a predominantly business
function within an organization, for example as a director or nonlegal officer of a corporation.”).

E.g., WEINSTEIN & BURGER, supra note 132, § 503.14[1] (“[T]he privilege is limited to
communications that are made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services to the
client. Thus, it does not extend to communications not so intended . . . .”).
142
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attach to communications outside that scope. The proposed statute, therefore,
only protects communications between an attorney and a client who receives or
seeks to retain legal services.143 It further specifies that legal services include “giving
legal advice, drafting legal documents, appearing and advocating for another
before a tribunal, negotiating the legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of
another, or any other services requiring an attorney’s professional and educated
judgment . . . .”144 Communications falling outside this definition are unprotected.

2. Unprotected Communications
The attorney-client privilege has limited applicability to some communications. Just as the current statute fails to define the communications that the
privilege protects, it similarly neglects to articulate those to which the protection
does not extend. This section outlines the communications most jurisdictions
recognize as falling outside the privilege’s reach.145

a. Those for the Purpose of Crime or Fraud
For over a century,146 courts have excluded communications from the
privilege’s protection if the client’s purpose for or use of legal services is to commit
a crime or fraud.147 At least three considerations underlie this policy. First, there
is little social interest in protecting communications when a client intending to
violate legal obligations consults an attorney.148 Second is the public interest in
preventing clients from using legal services for harmful ends.149 Third, morality
prefers denying protection on the grounds that the client’s wrongful intent forfeits
the privilege’s protection.150 Some commentators fear attorneys might not inquire
thoughtfully into their client’s disclosures or deliver forthright advice on how
to avoid criminal or fraudulent activity in order to evade the exception.151 This
assertion has, however, been rejected as improbable.152
143

Proposed Statute (a)(ii).

144

Id. (a)(v).

145

See infra notes 146 – 86 and accompanying text.

See Geoffrey C. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF
L. REV. 1061, 1063 – 69 (1978).
146

147
E.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (“A client who consults an attorney for
advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law.”).
148

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 2000).

149

Id.

150

Id.

E.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102 (5th Cir. 1970) (“[T]he cause of justice
requires that counsel be free to state his opinion as fully and forthrightly as possible without fear
of later disclosure to persons who might attack the transaction, and that without the cloak of
the privilege counsel may be ‘required by the threat of future discovery to hedge or soften their
opinions.’”) (citations omitted).
151

152

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 cmt. c.
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Consistent with this policy, the proposed statute does not prevent
communications from disclosure “if the legal services were sought or obtained
to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or fraud . . . .”153
Importantly, the exception does not apply to communications relating to a client’s
crimes or fraud occurring prior to the client seeking and obtaining an attorney’s
legal services.

b. Those Relevant to a Breach of the Attorney-Client Relationship
Fairness suggests that the privilege should not apply when the client puts the
attorney’s legal assistance at issue. Otherwise, a client could present the attorney’s
assistance in an “inaccurate, incomplete, and self-serving way.”154 Courts agree
that “it would be unjust for a party to that relationship to maintain the privilege
so as to preclude disclosure of confidential communications relevant to the issue
of breach.”155
Accordingly, the majority view holds that a client who puts their attorney’s
assistance in issue waives the privilege with respect to the relevant communications.156 In effect, waiver affords both parties the opportunity to establish the
facts giving rise to the claim. The proposed statute adopts this position, allowing
disclosure “as to a communication relevant to an issue of breach . . . of a duty
arising out of the attorney-client relationship . . . .”157

c. Those Offered in an Action between Joint Clients
Except for those persons reasonably necessary to facilitate communications
between an attorney and client, a third party’s presence typically destroys the
privilege, resulting in waiver.158 Similarly, the privilege is waived when a third
party learns of the communicated content indirectly.159

153

Proposed Statute (c)(iii).

154

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 80 cmt. b.

155

E.g., Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Willis, 191 F.R.D. 625, 632 (D. Kan. 2000).

E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 80(1)(b) (“The attorneyclient privilege is waived for any relevant communication if the client asserts as to a material issue in
a proceeding that . . . a lawyer’s assistance was ineffective, negligent, or otherwise wrongful.”).
156

157

Proposed Statute (c)(v).

158

See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text.

E.g., United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954)
(holding the privilege was waived where claimed privileged documents were indiscriminately
mingled with routine corporate documents with no special effort to preserve them in separate files).
159
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There is no waiver, however, when either an attorney jointly represents
multiple clients,160 or when separate attorneys represent multiple parties in a
common interest arrangement.161 The privilege applies in these contexts. But
if co-clients become adversaries in subsequent proceedings, neither may invoke
the privilege against the other.162 The rule is the same for parties in a common
interest arrangement.163
The rationale for allowing access to the previously protected information
appears to be two-fold. First, there is no principled way to decide who should
prevail if one client invokes the privilege against another.164 Second, allowing
clients to invoke the privilege against one another would be difficult to justify
because each has already disclosed the information to the other.165
In brief, consenting to joint representation or a common interest arrangement
means that each client assumes the risk of later disclosure. Thus, the proposed
statute allows disclosure “as to a communication relevant to a matter of common
interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any of
them to an attorney retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action
between any of the clients.”166

d. Where the Attorney is an Attesting Witness
A client’s attorney is often an attesting witness to a document disposing of
the client’s property. Such an attorney is in a position to know the decedent’s
testamentary intent. Furthermore, they are likely free from any personal interest
that could bias their testimony. Courts have therefore created an exception to the
attorney-client privilege when a confidential communication is relevant to an issue

E.g., Simpson v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 1974) (enouncing
where one lawyer represents two parties with a common interest, what each says is “privileged from
disclosure at the instance of a third person.”).
160

E.g., Hunton & Williams v. DOJ, 590 F.3d 272, 277 (4th Cir. 2010) (“The common
interest doctrine permits parties whose legal interests coincide to share privileged materials with one
another in order to more effectively prosecute or defend claims.”).
161

E.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that when
attorneys act for two or more persons with common interest, “neither party may exercise the
privilege in a subsequent controversy with the other”).
162

163
E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(“[A] communication [in a common interest arrangement] is not privileged as between clients . . .
in a subsequent adverse proceeding between them.”).
164

MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5:19.

165

Id.

166

Proposed Statute (c)(vi).
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between parties claiming an interest through the same client.167 The exception
is justified on the grounds that a decedent would likely want full disclosure to
facilitate carrying out their testamentary wishes.168 On this assumption, there
is little conflict with disclosure and the principle of encouraging full and frank
discussions.169 The proposed statute codifies this exception, permitting disclosure
“as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning an attested document to
which the attorney is an attesting witness.”170

e. When an Attorney Alters or Removes Evidence of a
Client’s Crime
The privilege has limited reach when a client provides evidence of or the
instrumentality used to perpetrate a crime to their attorney, or when the attorney
learns information from the client leading to such evidence or instrumentality.171
Consider a leading case, illustrative of such a limitation. In People v.
Meredith, an attorney’s investigator removed a robbery-murder victim’s wallet
from a location revealed by the defendant to their attorney.172 On appeal, the
California Supreme Court addressed whether the “observation of the location of
the wallet, the product of a privileged communication, finds protection under the
attorney-client privilege.”173 The court held the client’s disclosure of the
wallet’s location to the attorney to be privileged.174 Removing the wallet from
the location, however, destroyed it.175 When defense attorneys remove or alter
physical evidence, the court reasoned, they necessarily deprive the prosecution of
the opportunity to observe the evidence in its original condition or location.176
167
E.g., Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394, 406 (1897) (holding that in litigation between
devisees under a will, deceased client statements to attorneys regarding execution of a will are not
privileged); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5:29 (“[T]here is an exception to the
privilege for communications by a deceased client that are relevant in litigation between parties who
advance competing claims against assets to the estate.”).
168
United States v. Osborne 561 F.2d 1334, 1340 n.11 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The rationale behind
the exception to the general rule is that the privilege itself is designed for the protection of the
client, and it cannot be said to be in the interests of the testator, in a controversy between parties all
of whom claim under the testator, to have those confidential communications of the testator and
attorney excluded which are necessary to a proper fulfillment of the testator’s intent.”).

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 81 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(“It is . . . probable that the exception does little to lessen the inclination to communicate freely
with lawyers.”).
169

170

Proposed Statute (c)(vii).

171

See, e.g., People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981).

172

Id.

173

Id. at 48.

174

Id. at 51–52.

175

Id. at 53.

176

Id.
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Extending the privilege “to bar admission of testimony concerning the original
condition and location of the evidence” in such a case “permits the defense in
effect to ‘destroy’ critical information.”177 This case illustrates why there should
be a limitation applicable when a lawyer alters or removes physical evidence.
“[W]henever defense counsel removes or alters evidence, the . . . privilege does
not bar revelation of the original location or condition of the evidence . . . .”178
The court also provided insight concerning an attorney’s obligation when the
attorney comes into possession of evidence of a crime.179 In short, such evidence
should be given to law enforcement, after which, the evidence is admissible, but
not information regarding its source.180
Rule 3.4 of Wyoming’s Rules of Professional Conduct summarizes these
principles.181 Comment 2 states that a lawyer may “take temporary possession
of physical evidence of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a limited
examination that will not alter or destroy material characteristics of the
evidence.”182 It continues, “in such a case, applicable law may require the lawyer
to turn the evidence over to the police or other prosecuting authority . . . .”183
While Rule 3.4 concerns an attorney’s ethical duty when that attorney comes
into possession of the instrumentalities of a client’s crime, Wyoming’s current
attorney-client privilege statute does not address the admissibility of this type of
evidence. The proposed statute remedies this problem, following the approach in
People v. Meredith.184 The statute provides the following:
[A]n attorney coming into possession of evidence of a client’s
crime shall not be compelled to disclose the source of such
evidence, if, after retaining the evidence for a reasonable time to
subject it to examination, the attorney notifies the prosecuting
authorities of his or her possession of the evidence or turns it
over to them . . . .185
If, however, the attorney alters the condition of the evidence or removes it from
its original location after the client provides information leading to its location, a

177

Id.

178

Id. at 54.

179

Id. at 50.

180

See id. at 50, 52, 54 n.8.

181

See WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4 (2014).

182

Id. R. 3.4 cmt. 2.

183

Id.

184

Proposed Statute (c)(iv)(A); see supra notes 171– 80 and accompanying text.

185

Proposed Statute (c)(iv)(A).
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privilege holder may not prevent disclosure of the original condition or location
of the evidence.186

C. Can a Client be Compelled to Testify?
By its terms, Wyoming’s statute protects only attorneys, not clients, from
being compelled to testify about communications arising from the attorney-client
relationship.187 This approach does not, however, further the goals of the privilege.
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full and frank
communication between clients and attorneys. Full and frank communications
would be severely chilled if the privilege protected only attorneys, but not their
clients, from having to testify about their communications. The privilege against
disclosure, the Alabama Supreme Court noted:
[W]ould be a mockery if the client could be compelled to disclose
that as to which counsel’s lips are sealed. It would be absurd to
protect by solemn sanction professional communications when
the lawyer is examined, and to leave them unprotected at the
examination of the client.188
The proposed statute eliminates the current mockery of the attorney-client
privilege, protecting attorneys, as well as clients, from compelled disclosure of
privileged communications.189

D. Who May Claim the Privilege?
It is, or ought to be, uncontroversial that the attorney-client privilege belongs
to the client.190 As such, only the client, or their authorized agent, may invoke
or waive the privilege.191 Authorized agents include the client’s attorney.192 Only

186

Id. (c)(iv).

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (2017) (“The following persons shall not testify in
certain respects: [a]n attorney . . . concerning a communication made to him by his client . . . or his
advice to a client . . . .”).
187

188

Birmingham Ry. & Elec., Co., v. Wildman, 119 Ala. 547, 549–50 (Ala. 1898).

189

See Proposed Statute (a)(vi), (b).

See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Wiles, 143 F.R.D. 241, 247 (D. Colo. 1992) (“It is certainly true that
the attorney-client privilege belongs to [the client] . . . .”).
190

191
E.g., Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2010) (enouncing
that privilege belongs to the client and lawyer may claim it on their behalf ).
192
See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402 n.8 (1976) (explaining that the privilege
may be “raised by the attorney”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 78 (AM.
LAW INST. 2000); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5:32 (“The lawyer›s authority to claim
the privilege is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.”).
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by inference does the current statute reach this conclusion, however. It provides
that “[t]he attorney . . . may testify by express consent of the client . . . and if the
client voluntarily testifies the attorney . . . may be compelled to testify on the same
subject.”193 Such a statement, of course, is commensurate with the argument that
the privilege belongs to the client. The proposed statute removes the superfluous
need for inference, explicitly placing the privilege in the hands of the client or the
client’s authorized agent.194

IV. PROPOSED ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE STATUTE
The following proposal is not a proposed amendment to the current statute.
Rather, it is an entirely new statute. The reason for a new statute is that the number
of amendments necessary to correct the current statute’s deficiencies would be
considerable. The best approach is a new statute that makes sense.

(a)

as used in this statute:
(i)

an “attorney” is a person authorized, or a person the
client reasonably believes is authorized, to practice law in
any state or nation;

(ii)

a “client” is a person or entity who receives legal services
from an attorney or consults an attorney for the purpose
of retaining legal services;

(iii) a “confidential communication” is any expression between
privileged persons intended to convey information, made
with the reasonable belief that only privileged persons
will learn of its contents, including oral or written words,
or acts intended to communicate an idea;
(iv) an “entity” is an association, corporation, estate,
partnership, sole-proprietorship, trust, or any other
public or private organization;
(v)

“legal services” include giving legal advice, drafting legal
documents, appearing and advocating for another before
a tribunal, negotiating the legal rights or responsibilities
on behalf of another, or any other services requiring an
attorney’s professional and educated judgment;

(vi) a “privilege holder” is:
(A) the client or the client’s guardian or conservator, if
the client has a guardian or conservator;
193

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (2017).

194

See Proposed Statute (a)(vi).
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(B) the entity’s authorized representative;
(C) the deceased client’s personal representative, if the
client is dead;
(D) the attorney at the time of the confidential communication, unless another privilege holder authorizes
disclosing the confidential communication;
(vii) “privileged persons” include:
(A) the client;
(B) the attorney;
(C) an accountant, financial planner, non-attorney
support staff, language interpreter, or any other
person whose participation is reasonably necessary
to facilitate communication between the client and
the attorney;
(D) an employee or agent of an entity if the
communications pertain to the subject matter of
the attorney’s representation of the entity and are
within the scope of the employee’s or agent’s duties.
(b)

a privilege holder may prevent the disclosure of a confidential communication made between privileged persons for
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services to
the client.

(c)

a privilege holder may not prevent disclosure:
(i)

as to the client’s identity, unless disclosing the client’s
identity provides essential evidence to support convicting
the client of a crime;

(ii)

as to the fact of consultation between the attorney and
the client, the general subject matter of the consultation,
and information about fees, unless such evidence directly
or by reasonable inference would reveal the content of a
confidential communication;

(iii) if the legal services were sought or obtained to enable
or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime
or fraud;
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(iv) of the original condition or location of physical evidence,
if, after a client provides information leading to such
evidence, the attorney alters or removes it;
(A) an attorney coming into possession of evidence of
a client’s crime shall not be compelled to disclose
the source of such evidence, if, after retaining
the evidence for a reasonable time to subject it to
examination, the attorney notifies the prosecuting
authorities of his or her possession of the evidence
or turns it over to them;
(v)

as to a communication relevant to an issue of breach, by
the attorney or by the client, of a duty arising out of the
attorney-client relationship;

(vi) as to a communication relevant to a matter of common
interest between two or more clients if the communication
was made by any of them to an attorney retained or
consulted in common, when offered in an action between
any of the clients;
(vii) as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning
an attested document to which the attorney is an
attesting witness.

V. CONCLUSION
This article has aimed to clarify possible confusion concerning the
confidentiality arising from the attorney-client relationship. By discussing the
three bodies of law giving confidentiality its effect, the article helps Wyoming
attorneys understand when and under what conditions confidentiality applies.
Importantly, readers should now recognize that the broad ethical duty of
confidentiality does not necessarily prevent later disclosure of a client’s confidential
communications in judicial proceedings. Disclosure of ethically confidential
information in this context is only prevented when the information is privileged
work product or the attorney-client privilege applies.
The article has also argued that Wyoming’s current attorney-client
privilege statute does little to resolve the perplexing nature of confidentiality.
It has highlighted the problems the current statute creates and identified the
predominating solutions that other jurisdictions have adopted in response to
similar difficulties. Further, the article proposes a new attorney-client privilege
statute that gives better guidance to practicing Wyoming attorneys. The authors
hope the Wyoming Legislature will consider the proposed attorney-client
privilege statute.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol18/iss2/1

26

